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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a divorce case, involving errors made by the trial
court and the Utah Court of Appeals in the overall valuation and
distribution of the marital property vis-a-vis Dr. Sorensen's solo
dental practice, and the requirement that Dr. Sorensen pay a
portion of Mrs. Sorensen's expert witness fees.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
No addition facts need be set forth in connection with this
Reply Brief.

Dr. Sorensen relies on his Statement of Facts as set

forth in pages 6 through 17 of his Brief on Petition for Writ of
Certiorari.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
RESPONDENT HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THE
PROPRIETY OF THE DECISION BY THE UTAH
COURT OF APPEALS UPHOLDING THE VALUATION
AND
DISTRIBUTION
OF
"GOODWILL"
ATTRIBUTABLE TO DR. SORENSEN IN HIS SOLO
PROFESSION PRACTICE AS MARITAL PROPERTY.

RESPONDENT'S ASSERTION THAT DR.
SORENSEN DID NOT OBJECT TO THE TRIAL
COURT'S CONSIDERATION OF "GOODWILL"
IS INCORRECT
Respondent claims that Petitioner did not object at trial to
the issue of goodwill being considered in the valuation of Dr.
Sorensen's dental practice. That simply is not so. Mrs. Sorensen
called her expert to place a value on the practice.
76)

(Vol. I, R 54-

During this examination, Dr. Austin testified about his

written "qualified" opinion as set out on Exhibit "D."

(See A-32

Addendum to Petitioner's Brief.) He was^then cross examined as to
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how his conclusions relating to value would change if, for example,
Dr. Sorensen was to become disabled or to retire.

(Vol. I, R. 77-

89) At the conclusion of his testimony, Respondent then moved for
admission of Exhibit "D," to which Petitioner's counsel immediately
objected.

(Vol. I, R. 89)

That exhibit and supporting testimony

was then received by the trial court over Petitioner's timely
objection.

(Vol. I, R. 89).

Parenthetically, when Dr. Sorensen had an opportunity to
present his case, his accountant testified that at no time had
goodwill ever been shown as an asset of the practice. (Vol. I, R.
32)

Mr. Roger Nuttal, a second accountant, disputed inclusion of

goodwill as an asset of the dental practice.

(Vol. II, R. 24)

Succinctly put, the issue as to whether or not goodwill should
have been included was presented to the trial court and there was
a proper objection when the trial court was asked by Mrs. Sorensen
to consider it.

L.
Utah
is
aligned
with
those
jurisdictions
which
hold
that
"goodwill" of a solo professional
practice is not to be considered as
a divisible marital asset
Mrs. Sorensen contends that the decision of the Utah Court of
Appeals' upholding the trial courts' ruling that Dr. Sorensen's
professional practice has "goodwill" value which is divisible upon
divorce is in harmony with Utah law and is the favored rule
elsewhere. This argument is incorrect for two reasons. First, it
certainly is not the law in Utah. Second, while some jurisdictions
have decided

that a professional may possess goodwill to be

2

considered upon divorce, others more correctly reason that it is
not appropriate to consider the concept of professional goodwill
as

a divisible marital asset.
1.

In

Utah,

it

is

improper

to

value

and

distribute

"goodwill" attributable to a professional in solo practice as a
marital asset.
In Jackson v. Caldwell, 18 Utah 2d 81, 415 P. 2d 667 (Utah
1966), this court held that "goodwill" is not an element of value
in a business which depends upon the professional qualities of the
person who carries it on, specifically stating that:
It has repeatedly been held there can be
no "goodwill," so called, of a business which
depends for its existence upon the professional
qualities of the person who carry it on.
Goodwill cannot arise as an asset of a
partnership where the parties only contribute,
as capital, their professional skill and
reputation, however intrinsically valuable
these may be. [Footnote]
Id. at 670, 671.

(Emphasis added.)

This holding and the underlying principles set forth by this
Court in Jackson have not been changed or modified and Jackson is
still

the

law

in

Utah.

Where

Dr.

Sorensen

maintains

his

professional practice as a sole practitioner and the continued
success of that practice is entirely dependent upon his personal
skills and reputation then, consistent with the Jackson rule, there
can be no "goodwill" value of his practice to distribute upon
divorce.

To do so, as did the courts below in Sorensen, 82 0 (Utah

App. 1989) is error and is wrong.

3

The ruling by the court below in Sorensen is an aberration
entirely inconsistent and not in harmony with Utah's appellate
court decisions issued subsequent to Jackson which address the
question of professional "goodwill" as a marital asset.

In Dogu

v. Doau, 552 P.2d 1305, 1309 (Utah 1982), this court implicitly
held that an individual's earning power as a solo practitioner is
not divisible asset upon divorce; yet, the Sorensen court did so
by affirming an approach which valued future earning capacity,
labeled

it as "goodwill" and then awarded that value to Dr.

Sorensen as a marital "asset."

Later, in Gardner v. Gardner, 748

P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988) this court recognized that goodwill may be
a marital asset.

There, however, Dr. Gardner was a member of an

on-going business concern employing twenty-three physicians, the
continuing success . of which was not dependent entirely on his
reputation and continuing association; a situation quite different
from Dr. Sorensen's practice which depended entirely upon Dr.
Sorensen's personal bills and obligations for its success.

Most

recently, in Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P. 2d 952 (Utah App. 1988) , the
court reaffirmed the Jackson rule, stating:
There can be no goodwill in a business that is
dependent for its existence upon the individual
who conducts that enterprise and would vanish
were the individual to die, retire or quit
work. Jackson v. Caldwell 18 Utah 2d at 86,
415 P.2d at 670.
Id. at 946.
The decisions in DogU/ Gardner and Stevens are in harmony with
this Court's holding in Jackson; the holding in Sorensen is in
conflict with existing Utah case law as established by this Court.

4

The principle of stare decisis should have been applied by the
courts below. Respondent's assertion that other jurisdiction have
decided the issue of goodwill differently is simply not material
and avoids the issue as to what is the present law in Utah.
2.

Utah follows the sound approach of her sister states

which hold that professional

"goodwill11 is not a subject for

consideration in the division of marital property.
While some jurisdictions have decided that a professional may
possess goodwill subject to consideration in a divorce action,
others more correctly reach the opposite conclusion that it is
inappropriate to consider the concept of professional goodwill as
a divisible marital asset.

Based upon this Court's statement in

Jackson, supra, and it's most recent statements in Peterson v.
Peterson, 737 P.2d 237 (Utah App. 1987), and Rayburn v. Rayburn,
738 P.2d 238 (Utah App. 1987), pertaining to the non-divisibility
upon divorce of professional degrees which serve as the basis for
the income production, Utah follows the latter position and has
specifically rejected the position urged by Respondent.
Utah follows her sister states, including Wisconsin, Texas,
Louisiana,

Kansas,

Maryland,

Missouri,

Nebraska,

Illinois,

Pennsylvania, Tennessee and New York which hold that professional
goodwill is not a subject for consideration in the division of
marital property.

See Sorensen, supra, 769 P.2d 825.

Although

Respondent argues that such an approach is antiquated, it continues
to be the subject of contemporary analysis and support.

In

Holbrook v. Holbrook, 309 N.W.2d 343 (Wis.App. 1981), a complete
copy of which is included in the Addendum to Petitioner's lead
5

Brief, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals concluded that the trial
court

improperly

distributed

"goodwill"

attributable

to

the

husband's practice as marital property and it reasoned that the
more sound analysis was that which has been the law in Utah since
1966 when Jackson v. Caldwell was decided.

In so holding that

professional goodwill is not a divisible asset, the Wisconsin court
stated:
The concept of professional goodwill evanesces
when one attempts to distinguish it from future
earning capacity.
Although a professional
business's
good
reputation,
which
is
essentially what its goodwill consists of, is
certainly a thing of value, we do not believe
that it bestows on those who have an ownership
interest in the business, an actual, separate
property interest. The reputation of a law
firm or some other professional business is
valuable to its individual owners to the extent
that it assures continued substantial earnings
in the future. It cannot be separately sold
or pledged by the individual owners.
The
goodwill or reputation of such a business
accrues to the benefit of the owners only
through increased salary.
Hglbrook, Id. at 354.
Similarly, in Powell v. Powell, 648 P.2d 218 (Kansas 1982),
the Supreme Court for Kansas held that:
We are not persuaded a professional practice
such as Dr. Powell's has a goodwill value.
The practice is personal to the practitioner.
When he or she dies or retires nothing remains.
The professional's files and lists of clients
are of no use to others. The very nature of
a professional practice is that it is totally
dependent upon the professional. We refuse to
adopt
the theory
that goodwill
in a
professional practice is an asset subject to
division in a divorce action. The issue is
without merit.
Id. at 223 & 224.
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See also Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1972) a copy of
which has been included in the Addendum to Petitioner's lead Brief;
In Re;

Marriage of Wielder, 461 N.E.2d, 447 (111. 1983); Taylor

v. Taylor, 336 N.W.2d 851 (Neb. 1986); Carter v. Carter, 616
S.W.2d, 543 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) and Hirschi v. Hirschi, 710 S.W.2d
942 (Tex. App. El Paso, 1989), DeMasi v. DeMasif 530 A.2d 871 (Pa.
Super. 1987); Depner v. Depner, 478 So.2d 532 (La. 1985); In Re:
Courtright, 507 N.E. 2d 891 (111. App. 3 Distr. 1987); Hanson v.
Hanson, 738 S.W. 2d 429 (Mo. banc 1987); Antolik v. Harvey, 761
P.2d 305 (Ha. App. 1968); Prahinski v. Prahinski, 540 A.2d 833 (Md.
App. 1988); Pearce v. Pearce, 482 So.2d 1098 (La. 1986).
When considered together Holbrook and Powell, supra highlight
the critical distinction to be made between true goodwill which is
a saleable asset and professional reputation which is personal to
the practitioner and indistinguishable from earning capacity. True
goodwill in a business exists separately from the practitioner and
is independent of that practitioner's continued involvement in the
business (see, e.g. Gardner, supra).

No "goodwill" separate from

the practitioner's earning capacity exists, however, where the
professional's practice would disappear upon that professional's
immediate withdrawal from practice.

This critical distinction

between true goodwill value and professional reputation is properly
observed in Utah and her sister states which refuse to consider
"goodwill" as a marital asset subject to valuation and distribution
where any such value is attributable to a professional in solo
practice; it is improperly blurred by those jurisdictions holding
otherwise.

Although this distinction
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is essentially lost in

Respondent's Argument, it was recognized at trial by her expert
witness, Dr. Austin. His valuation of Dr. Sorensen's solo practice
assumed that Dr. Sorensen would cooperate and participate in the
practice during an orderly sale or transfer period.

(Tr. Vol. 1

at 70-76, 83)

The necessity of Dr. Sorensen's assistance in any

transfer

his

of

practice

underscores

the

very

personal

characteristics of his practice and the fact that no value would
exist independent of Dr. Sorensen1s reputation and willingness to
continue to lend his good name to practice.
The decisions of Utah's sister states and our Supreme Court
in Jackson as well as our Court of Appeals in Stevens, articulate
the better rule, and in fact the law in Utah, that professional
goodwill is not an asset subject to valuation and distribution in
a divorce action.

Consequently, the court below erred in placing

any value whatsoever on the "goodwill" of Dr. Sorensen's dental
practice and distributing that value as a marital asset.

THE COURT BELOW ACTED ARBITRARILY AND
CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE DISTRIBUTING
"GOODWILL" ATTRIBUTABLE
TO
DR.
SORENSEN IN HIS SOLO PROFESSIONAL
PRACTICE AS A MARITAL ASSET WHERE
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING
ITS VALUE AT THE TIME OF THE MARRIAGE
AND THE EVIDENCE THAT WAS PRESENTED
SHOWED ANY SUCH VALUE TO BE
PREMARITAL
Mrs.

Sorensen

establishing

failed

"goodwill" value

professional practice
marriage.

to

present

any

attributable

evidence
to

Dr.

at

trial

Sorensenfs

(Vol. I, P. 76; Ex. D) at the time of

The evidence presented by Dr. Sorensen showed he had
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maintained a successful solo practice for approximately six years
before the marriage. At the time of divorce, he had fewer patients
and greater overhead (Vol. I, P. 288; Vol II, p.88, 121).

His

annual income, after CPI adjustments, was less at the time of trial
than at the time of the marriage (Vol. II, p. 26-27).

These facts

were not controverted and lead to the inescapable conclusion that
any "goodwill11 value Dr. Sorensen may have accumulated in his
practice through his reputation, expertise and client loyalty
existed prior to the parties1 marriage and, therefore, was separate
property and should not have been included as marital property.
Consistent with this court's decision in Preston v. Preston, 649
P.2d 705, 706 (Utah 1982), and Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d
304,

(Utah 1988), the courts below should have returned any

goodwill

value

professional

attributable

practice

as

to

Dr.

premarital

Sorensen
and

in

separate

his

solo

property.

Instead, as Judge Jackson in his dissent in Sorensen correctly
pointed out, the trial court arbitrarily and without evidence
proportioned this "goodwill" value over the course of the practice,
and treated a percentage of this "goodwill" as marital property.
Mrs. Sorensen seeks to sanction this unfair result to her advantage
overlooking her fatal proof defect in failing to establish what,
if any, portion of the "goodwill" was accumulated during the
marriage.
This inequity should not be condoned and the Court of Appeals
should not be allowed to so substantially depart from the accepted
and usual course of judicial proceedings requiring that the trial
court have before it evidence on the value of an asset as of the

9

date of marriage and the date of trial

in order to determine if

any part of the asset should be treated as marital property.

The

courts below erred and abused their discretion, resulting in
material unfairness and inequity to Dr. Sorensen which should not
be upheld.
POINT II
THE COURT BELOW IMPROPERLY CONSIDERED
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE IN THE VALUATION
OF DR. SORENSEN»S SOLO PROFESSIONAL
PRACTICE WHILE REQUIRING HIM TO PAY
CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY FROM THOSE
RECEIVABLES
THEREBY
UNFAIRLY
PROVIDING MRS. SORENSEN A DOUBLE
RECOVERY
Mrs. Sorensen argues that Dogu v. Dogu. 652 P.2d 13 08 (Utah
1982) stands only for the proposition that the trial court did not
abuse its decision in valuing Dr. Dogu's professional corporation.
This argument might have merit were it not for this Court fs
explicit

statement

in

that

case

regarding

Dr.

Dogu's

sole

professional corporation's accounts receivable.
In Doau, supra, the court not only affirmed the trial court's
method of valuing the professional corporation but defined and
elaborated on the issue of accounts receivable by specifically
excluding those receivables and defining them as:
. . . deferred income from which respondent may
meet his ongoing alimony and child support
obligations to appellant.
Id. at 1309.
Like Dr. Dogu, Dr. Sorensen was required to pay alimony and
child support.

Like Dr. Dogu, Dr. Sorensen should be able to use

those receivables, if and when paid, to help him meet his ongoing
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support obligations.

In cases when there are no-going child

support or alimony obligations, it may be appropriate exercise of
discretion to treat accounts receivable as an asset in the overall
property distribution.

But in cases where there are on-going

support obligations, treating accounts receivable as both an item
of property to be distributed and a fund from which to pay support
double charges the person who is to pay support and who is to
receive the accounts receivable.

It was error and not in keeping

with the directive of Dogu, supra, to include the receivables as
an asset to be awarded to Dr. Sorensen. By so doing, Mrs. Sorensen
received a double benefit and got not only the egg but a piece of
the goose that lays it.
This inequitable result dramatizes the inherently

flawed

analogy comparing the valuation and distribution of a true business
partnership upon dissolution to that of a solo professional
practice upon divorce. Such an analogy is particularly flawed where
there are on-going support obligations of the professional based
upon

anticipated

income

generated

by

him

in

his

practice.

Traditional accounting methods of valuating in such circumstances,
including calculations valuing professional "goodwill" and accounts
receivable, simply do not square with Utah's legal concepts of
"equitable distribution" of property and support entitlements upon
divorce.
In Dogu, the accounts receivable were correctly excluded from
the value of the Dr. Dogu's professional corporation.

In this

case,

of

the

professional

receivables

were

corporation,

included

however,

11

in

Dr.

the

value

Sorensenfs

the

accounts

receivable reflect the income from which he is to pay his support
awards.

Consequently, those receivables were erroneously included

as a marital "asset" improperly causing an unfair imbalance in the
overall property distribution.
The same issue was presented to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
in the case of Johnson v. Johnson, 254 N.W. 2d 201 (Wis. 1977),
where a trial court's decision to exclude a physician's accounts
receivable from consideration in the property distribution was
found to be correct.

In explaining its decision, the Wisconsin

Supreme Court stated:
The trial court considered accounts
receivable as the equivalent to salary. In
considering the amount of alimony and support
to be awarded, it looked to Dr. Johnson's
salary and his ability to pay.
It was not
error to view the receivables as salary. If
Dr. Johnson remained with the clinic, the
receivables would be paid as salary. If they
left, they would take the place of salary while
he established his new practice. Because the
receivables were viewed as salary, it would
have been error to include them in the assets
available for distribution.
Id. at 201-202.
Accounts receivable amount to nothing more than future income.
Professional spouses such as Dr. Sorensen receive income when these
accounts are paid. Inclusion of the accounts in the marital estate
is equivalent to placing a non-professional spouse's future wages
into the property formula. This treatment of accounts receivables
results in the professional spouse receiving a much smaller portion
of the tangible marital estate.
This double penalty was recognized by the Docru court.

The

double penalty becomes even more inequitable where the accounts
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receivable represent a significant portion of the property awarded
to the professional spouse.

Here, the trial court awarded Dr.

Sorensen accounts receivable which amounted to over 20% of the
value of his professional corporation which he was awarded as a
part of his share of the marital estate.
In failing to follow this Court's decision in Dogu, supra, the
Courts below have provided Mrs. Sorensen the double benefit of
receiving

ongoing

support

awards based

substantially

on Dr.

Sorensen's income (which includes accounts receivable as paid) and
property values to offset the accounts receivable awarded to Dr.
Sorensen - a "double-dip" for Mrs. Sorensen and a "double charge
for Dr. Sorensen.
By failing to follow the law established by this Court, the
courts below have sanctioned an unfair result for Dr. Sorensen.
Accordingly, this court should reverse the decision by the courts
below and remand

the matter

for a fair reallocation

of the

remaining marital estate.
POINT III
RESPONDENT HAS FAILED TO SHOW THAT
DR. SORENSEN^ ACTUAL ACCOUNTS
PAYABLE
WERE
CONSIDERED
IN
ESTABLISHING A VALUE TO HIS DENTAL
PRACTICE
Mrs. Sorensen contends, essentially, that the accounts payable
of Dr. Sorensen's practice were included in the value ascribed to
the practice by Mrs. Sorensen's expert witness because that witness
examined Dr. Sorensen's average expenses and receipts over a threeyear period.

Such an examination certainly cannot be considered

as an examination of balances owing on accounts payable owed by Dr.
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Sorensen's practice at trial. For example, an individual may have
a recurring monthly debt service expense, but this expense has
little or no relationship to the total debt balance outstanding
which is a liability to be considered when determining net worth.
The trial court accepted at face value the evidence of Respondent
and her expert witness, Dr. Austin, and the figures set forth on
Exhibit D in valuing Dr. Sorensen's dental practice.
"D" in the Addendum to Dr. Sorensen's main Brief)

(See Exhibit
That estimate

of value is inaccurate on its face because it fails to consider
the fact, as established by Sorensen's accountants, that there were
$10,129.00 in "hard" accounts payable which the dental practice
owed (Vol. II, p. 23)

Nowhere in the record or in that Exhibit D

is it shown that these "hard" accounts payable were considered in
arriving at the net value of to Dr. Sorensen's practice.

To not

have considered that liability in reaching a decision on the
claimed net value of the dental practice was reversible error and
created a further imbalance in the overall property distribution.
Dr. Sorensen raised this error on appeal, but the Utah Court
of Appeals held that if these "hard" payables were overlooked, then
the error was simply "harmless."
In State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989), this Court held
that:
Errors we label as "harmless" are errors
which, although properly preserved on appeal,
are sufficiently inconsequential that we
conclude there is no reasonable likelihood that
the error affected the outcome of the
proceeding. [Footnote citations omitted]
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Courts in other states give essentially the same definition
to "harmless error" does in Utah, See, e.g. State v. Kitchen, 730
P.2d 103, 107 (Wash. App. 1986), where harmless error is defined
as:
. . . an error which is trivial, formal,
or merely academic, was not prejudicial to the
substantial rights of the defendant, and in no
way affected the final outcome of the case.
State v. Kitchen, 730, P.2d 103, 107 (Wash.
App. 1986).
While Verde and Kitchen involve criminal issues, the are they
equally applicable to civil cases where substantial rights are
infringed upon as in Sorensen this case where the final property
settlement was unjust weighted in favor of Mrs. Sorensen.
It stretches the imagination to fairly conclude that an error
of over $10,000 in the valuation of the Sorensen's property is
"harmless."

In affirming on the accounts payable issue, the Court

of Appeals rationalized and, in essence, concluded that even if 10%
of the value of the dental practice had been overlooked ($100,000
minus $10,129 accounts payable), that oversight was harmless. This
is a clear case of the Utah Court of Appeals' attempting to avoid
a reversal on the dental practice valuation issue.
sanctioned.

It cannot be

To do so, creates a "harmless error" category into

which almost any aspect of a trial court's decision can fall,
should an appellate court chose to do so, and gives absolutely no
guidance to trial courts and litigants as to what is or is not
"harmless error."
The decision of the Utah Court of Appeals relating to the
issue of accounts payable should be reversed by this Court, and
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the matter should be remanded for a reallocation of the marital
assets in accord with each of the property modifications requested
by Dr. Sorensen in this appeal.
POINT IV
REGARDLESS OF HOW THE DETERMINATION
REGARDING
EXPERT
WITNESS
FEES
IS
CHARACTERIZED, IT WAS STILL ERRONEOUS AND
CONTRARY TO UTAH LAW
The Utah Supreme Court in Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1280 (Utah
1980) held that it was improper for a trial court to require one
party to pay the other party's expert witness fees related to
preparation for and attendance at trial.

In reversing the trial

court's award of those fees characterized as costs/ the court
remanded with instructions that the award be adjusted to eliminate
any fees awarded above the statutory witness fee rate.

Id. at

1384.
In Sorensen, the parties had acquired several pieces of real
estate.

Mr. Heiskenan, the expert whose fees are in question,

appraised each property and testified on behalf of Mrs. Sorensen.
Dr. Sorensen called his own appraisers to testify as to the value
of the properties.

In comparing the testimony of each appraiser

with the ultimate decision of the trial court as to value, it is
clear that all of Mr. Heiskenan's values were accepted by the trial
court whereas none of the values presented by Dr. Sorensen's
appraisers were utilized in the overall property distribution.

It

is also important to note that Mr. Heiskenanfs fees not only
included fees related to preparing the appraisals but also fees
related to his testimony at trial.
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Respondent

first

argues

that

because

Dr.

Sorensen

had

previously agreed to advance the initial appraisal fee to Mr.
Heiskenan during the pre-trial proceedings, with the ultimate
decision as to responsibility for payment to be reserved for trial,
then he is now somehow precluded from challenging the propriety of
the trial court's order requiring him to pay a portion of those
fees. The ultimate responsibility for the Heiskenen fees, however,
was reserved for trial.
responsibility

Dr. Sorensen never agreed to assume

for the fees.

He expressly reserved ultimate

responsibility for payment of those fees as an issue for trial (R.
57-58) , and can in no way be said to have waived his rights to
challenge an award of witness fees.
Respondent next argues that the fees which Dr. Sorensen was
ordered to pay are something akin to attorney's fees thereby giving
the trial court discretion to make an award of the same.

This

argument is equally without merit and is in conflict with the law
as set out in Kerr, supra, and Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771
(Utah 1980) . There, this court stated the general rule that costs
are those fees which are required to be paid to the court and to
witnesses and for which the statutes authorize to be included in
the judgment.

Id. at 774. Respondent cites no contrary authority

and there is no basis upon which to analogize witness fees to
attorney's fees.
At the conclusion of the trial, Mrs. Sorensen requested that
Dr. Sorensen pay all of her expert witness fees and in response to
that request, the trial court ordered that:
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. . . Each party shall pay their own experts
with the exception of Allan Heiskenan which
shall be shared equally. (Paragraph 23, Decree
of Divorce; R. 96.)
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's award of
expert witness fees in direct contradiction to the decision of this
Court in Kerr where it was held that:
This Court has recently held in the decision
in Frampton v. Wilson [footnote], that expert
witness fees may not be taxed as costs over and
above the statutory rate [footnote].
We
therefore remand to the trial court for an
adjustment of the award.
Id. at 138.
Based on this principle, the only costs which could be assessed Dr.
Sorensen would be the statutory rate of $14.00 per day, as provided
in Section 21-5-4, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended).
The Court of Appeals erred in requiring Dr. Sorensen to pay
one-half of these professional fees for expert services rendered
and that portion of the Decree requiring Dr. Sorensen to pay onehalf of Mr. Heiskenan's expert witness fees should be vacated.
RESPONSE TO ARGUMENTS ON CROSS PETITION
ARGUMENT
POINT I
RESPONDENTS EVIDENCE ON THE ISSUE
OF ATTORNEYS FEES WAS FATALLY
DEFECTIVE; THEREFORE, THE COURT OF
APPEALS WAS CORRECT IN REVERSING THE
AWARD OF THE TRIAL COURT
Section 30-3-3, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended), provides a
divorce court with the authority to award attorney's fees in
divorce actions.

However the law in Utah is clear that any such

award must be supported by evidence that it is both reasonable in
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amount and reasonably needed by the requesting party. Kerr v. Kerr
610 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1980).
While Mrs. Sorensen testified that she had incurred attorney's
fees (Vol. I, p. 145), and wanted her husband to pay them because
she presently had no income (Vol. I, p. 148), the only evidence
presented to the trial court relative to the required element of
reasonableness was the statement of account of Mrs. Sorensenfs
counsel (Exhibit V ) , and the following exchange between the court
and counsel at the close of Mrs. Sorensen!s case:
MR. HEALY:
Your Honor, we have also
agreed that I would proffer to the court at
this time the attorney fees and state what this
is based on.
THE COURT:
Would you stipulate Mr.
Echard, that if Mr. Healy were to testify, that
he would testify that his fee in this matter
is $3,587.50, in addition therewith some
witness subpoena fees. The stipulation would
not go to the question of whether or not they
are reasonable or whether they should be
awarded, but that would be his testimony. May
it be so stipulated?
MR. ECHARD:

It may, Your Honor.

THE COURT: The Court would receive the
stipulation for that purpose. Maybe we ought
to have this marked, Mr. Healy marked as V.
(Vol. I, p. 214.)
There was also a second exchange between counsel and the court in
relation

to Mrs. Sorensen1s

attorney's

supplemental

Exhibit X, at the end of trial:
MR. ECHARD: I agreed, Your Honor, that
counsel could make a proffer as to attorney
fees. I would not agree to it, but I would
accept it as to what he would testify to with
that.
MR. HEALY: These are additional fees in
connection with the further hearing.
19

billing,

THE COURT: That is Exhibit X, and the
Court will accept that as a proffer of
additional fees in this matter. (Whereupon,
plaintiff's
Exhibit X was received
in
evidence.) (Vol. II, p. 171.)
There was no
attorney's fees.

other

evidence presented

to

the

court on

As such, that evidence was not sufficient to

fulfill the requirements set out in Talley v. Talley, 739 p.,2d 83,
84 (Utah App. 1987), that:
"In divorce cases, an award of attorney
fees must be supported by evidence that it is
reasonable in amount and reasonably needed by
the party requesting the award." Huck v. Huck,
734 P.2d 417, 419 (Utah 1986).
Although
plaintiff sufficiently demonstrated reasonable
financial need, she failed to present evidence
of the reasonableness of the fee requested.
At the close of plaintiff's case, her counsel
proffered testimony and produced an exhibit
itemizing the time and costs expended by him,
his associates, and his clerk, and the hourly
rates charged for each. Conspicuously absent
is any evidence "regarding the necessity of the
number of hours dedicated, the reasonableness
of the rate charged in light of the difficulty
of the case and the result accomplished, and
the rates commonly charged for divorce actions
in the community . . . " Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d
1380, 1384-85 (Utah 1980).
Because plaintiff failed in her burden of
establishing the reasonableness of the attorney
fees requested, we reverse the award of
attorney fees. Beals v. Beals, 682 P. 2d 862
(Utah 1984); Delatore v. Delatore, 680 P.2d 27
(Utah 1984). Id. at 32.
Likewise, conspicuously absent in this case is any evidence
regarding the necessity of the number of hours dedicated, the
reasonableness of the rate charged in light of the difficulty of
the case and the result accomplished and the rates commonly charged
for divorce actions in the community.
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This required evidence as

to the reasonableness of Mrs. Sorensen's attorney's fee was totally
lacking at trial. Further, the record is devoid of any testimony,
direct or proffered, which related to the necessity of the number
of hours dedicated, the reasonableness of the rate charged in light
of the difficulty of the case and the result accomplished, and the
rates commonly charged for divorce actions in the community.
Parenthetically, there is also no finding of fact or reference
in the trial court's ruling related to the evidence required to
support an award of attorney's fees to Mrs. Sorensen.
Even assuming arguendo that this evidence is not specifically
necessary, the proffer which was presented was still defective on
the general question of reasonableness of the requested fee.

The

stipulation as to the proffer went only to the amount of Mr.
Healy's fees as reflected on the proposed Exhibit V and X.

The

stipulation

the

specifically

excluded

the

question

of

reasonableness of the requested fee, as the interchange between the
Court and counsel clearly shows (See Vol. I, p. 214 and Vol. II P.
171) .

In view of these evidentiary deficiencies and the law in

Utah as articulated

in Talley, supra, the Court of Appeals'

decision reversing any award of attorney's fees to Mrs. Sorensen
was entirely correct.
POINT II
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY
EXERCISED THEIR DISCRETION IN DENYING
MRS. SORENSEN'S REQUEST FOR AWARD OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL
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RESPONDENT•S REQUEST FOR
ATTORNEYS
FEES
WAS
UNTIMELY
Plaintiff's request for fees on appeal was not properly raised
nor briefed and was untimely.

The only reference to her request

for attorney's fees on appeal is found in her four-line conclusion
on page 24 of her Responsive brief filed with the Utah Court of
Appeals where she states:
Mrs, Sorensen asks this Court (i) to affirm the
decision of the district court; (ii) to award
her the costs she has incurred on appeal; and
(iii) to award her attorney's fees for
defending this appeal.
Nowhere in her brief to the Court of Appeals does she argue the
matter or delineate it as an issue on appeal.

Having failed to

properly raise and argue the issue before the Court of Appeals she
should not be entitled to do so now.
&.

RESPONDENT HAS FAILED TO
DEMONSTRATE A NEED FOR
ATTORNEYS FEES ON APPEAL
An award of attorney's fees in a divorce action, whether at
trial or on appeal, must be based

on evidence

showing both

reasonableness of the need and of the amount unless the appeal is
frivolous or without merit.

See Kerr v. Kerr, supra, and Talley

v. Talley, 739 P.2d 83 (Utah App. 1988).

Mrs. Sorensen has failed

to demonstrate her need in either regard. She was awarded alimony,
child

support

and

approximately

$131,000

in assets

from the

marriage as acknowledged by the Court of Appeals in Sorensen v.
Sorensen, 769 P.2d 820 (Utah App. 1989) at 831.

22

RESPONDENT• S REQUEST FOR
ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL
INAPPROPRIATE AND CONTRARY
IS TO UTAH LAW
Attorney's fees on appeal are granted only in the discretion
of the court in conformance with statute or rule.
Maughn, 770 P. 2d 156 (Utah App. 1989).

Mauahn v.

They are generally awarded

an appeal only where the appeal is shown to be frivolous or without
merit. See e.g., Ehnincrer v. Ehninger, 569 P.2d 1104 (Utah 1977).
Moreover, where an appeal results in a partial reversal, as in this
case, then an appeal is meritorious and an award of attorney's fees
on appeal is improper.

Workman v. Workman, 652 P. 2d 931 (Utah

1982) .
An award of attorney's fees in the case now before this Court
would be particularly inappropriate, unfair and chilling to the
rights of the citizens of this state in seeking legal relief and
redress.

The issues presented to the Utah Court of Appeals, and

now to this Court, involve important questions of State law and a
departure from current Utah case law. An award of attorney's fees
against the Petitioner/Appellant/Defendant who has relied upon
current Utah law governing the issues related to the appeal would
be unfair and oppressive.
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF
The majority opinion in the Utah Court of Appeals in Sorensen
is substantively erroneous in five respects and did not follow
existing Utah law as established by this Court and the Utah State
Legislature in at least four instances:
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1.

Under Utah law, goodwill of a professional solo practice

is not an element of value subject to distribution as marital
property as is set forth in the Jackson and Stevens cases, supra;
2.

Premarital property is not subject to distribution as

marital property absent extraordinary circumstances not existing
in this case, as is set forth in Preston, supra;
3.

Accounts receivable are deferred income not subject to

distribution as marital property, as is set forth in Dgcju, supra,
and to distribute accounts receivable as a marital asset when those
receivables are relied upon to meet support obligations results in
a "double dip" to the recipient and a double charge to the payor;
4.

Accounts payable must be

included

in the valuation

process distributing the marital estate; and
5.

A litigant's expert witness fees are not costs taxable

to the opposing party beyond the statutory rate as set forth in
Frampton and Kerr cases and Section 21-5-4 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as
amended).
In all five instances, the decision by the Utah Court of
Appeals in Sorensen upholding the ruling of the trial court are
contrary to those of this court and must, therefore, be reversed.
The assignment of value to professional goodwill and accounts
receivable as marital property should be vacated.

Dr. Sorensen1s

accounts payable should be deducted from the value of the marital
property and the Heiskenan expert witness fees should be vacated.
The trial court should then be instructed to modify the overall
property distribution consistent with those adjustments and then
to reallocate the remaining marital property to achieve parity

24

between the parties.
The Court of Appeals was entirely correct in reversing the
trial court award of attorney's fees to Mrs. Sorensen where she
failed

to

present

evidence

sufficient

to

establish

the

reasonableness of her attorney's fees as is required in Talley,
supra.

Further, the Court of Appeals properly exercised its

discretion under the circumstances in denying Mrs. Sorensen her
attorney's fees on appeal.
Dr. Sorensen should be awarded his costs related to this
appeal.
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